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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

JORDEN HOLLINGSWORTH,

Case No. 3:25-cv-01342-AB

Petitioner,

v.

SANOFI-AVENTIS US; CHATTEM INC.; QUTEN RESEARCH INSTITUTE LLC; AMJ SERVICES LLC; DRVM LLC; DEEPAK CHOPRA; MAGED BOUTROS; ASHRAF BOUTROS; MARIE-LAURIE AMIARD-BOUTROS,

Respondents.

PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT DR. DEEPAK CHOPRA'S MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

Respondent Dr. Deepak Chopra seeks dismissal on three grounds: lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service, and failure to state a claim. None withstand scrutiny.

This case involves a complex network of shell entities and interlocking trusts structured in ways that obscure ownership, hinder accountability, and route Petitioner's employment, along with that of others — through dissolved or fictitious companies that ultimately operated for the benefit of multinational pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Aventis US. This case mainly targets Sanofi-Aventis US's control via shell entities, with Chopra as a potential beneficiary. Petitioner names Respondents based on filings to uncover Sanofi's control, not to target individuals.

Public filings across Oregon, Nevada, Utah, and Florida bear Chopra's name. He is listed as organizer/manager of Rita GP Partners LLC (*Exhibit K*), an entity named after his wife but controlled by him, tied directly to the same 411 E. Bonneville Avenue address appearing on Petitioner's paystubs (*Exhibit A*). Chopra also personally signed Florida filings with the CEO of his own Foundation. (*Exhibit F*)

Respondents were not blindsided. Respondents confirm notice as early as March 2025. For six months, Chopra's name remained in the arbitration caption without correction while JAMS served dozens of notices to the Chopra Foundation address (*Exhibit M*), the same address later used by the U.S. Marshals. If Chopra were uninvolved, he or his counsel could have clarified immediately. especially given the involvement of government agencies and the seriousness of the allegations tied to the 'Deepak Chopra' name.

Given that multiple individuals named Dr. Deepak Chopra are active in wellness, healthcare, and the supplement industry, Petitioner had a clear good-faith basis to name him. If Respondent truly had no connection, the seriousness of the allegations and government whistleblower filings provided every reason to clarify at once, yet no clarification ever came.

At most, Chopra's denial creates factual disputes about identity and control. Under controlling precedent, such disputes warrant jurisdictional and identity discovery, not dismissal. *Laub v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003); Harris Rutsky & Co. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).*

For these reasons, Chopra's motion should be denied or, in the alternative, limited discovery should be ordered.

I. PETITIONER HAD A GOOD-FAITH BASIS TO NAME CHOPRA AS A RESPONDENT

The central defense, that Petitioner named 'the wrong person' — fails against the documentary record. Corporate filings, trust registrations, and Chopra's own signatures provided a clear good-faith basis to name him. If Respondent truly believed he was uninvolved, the straightforward remedy was to notify Petitioner, reach out to correct the record, or otherwise disavow the connection at the outset. Given the public reputation attached to the name 'Deepak Chopra,' and the fact that his name was being used in connection with allegations of a nationwide fraudulent workforce, the failure to clarify is even more striking. That silence, despite multiple opportunities, only reinforces that naming him was reasonable.

A. Oregon Nexus: KD Trans LLC and the Dominari 224 Trust

Oregon filings show KD Trans LLC (*Exhibit C*) registered to a Portland apartment complex, later placed under the Dominari 224 Trust in Kansas. Chopra's name appears on these filings, directly tying him to Oregon, the forum state. Even minimal forum contacts through corporate affiliations support jurisdictional inquiry. *Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1132–35.*

Similarly, Chopra is listed on *TPD IP LLC, DC DELHI GP LLC, DC-DM STEWARDSHIP LLC, DCPB HOLDINGS LLC, FRANCIS 1182 LLC, RITA GP PARTNERS LLC*, (*Exhibit G-L*), entities tied to the same Bonneville network and sharing overlapping officers with Respondents. Like KD Trans, these entites demonstrates that Chopra's name does not appear in isolation but is part of a consistent pattern of entities linked to the same hub.

B. Bonneville Address Overlap in Nevada

Multiple filings in Nevada list Chopra's name and connect to 411 E. Bonneville Avenue, the very address on Petitioner's paystub. (*Exhibit A, C, G – L*) Overlapping entities at this address are not coincidence; they are hallmarks of common control. Courts routinely treat such overlap as evidence sufficient for jurisdictional discovery. *Laub, 342 F.3d at 1093.*

In conducting the initial investigation to identify all individuals benefitting from the structure, one key marker was distance. How far each entity and respondent operated from one another. Nearly all Respondents were located within roughly an hour of each other, tied back to the Bonneville address. Against this backdrop of geographic proximity and overlapping entities, Respondent's claim that he is 'from New York' and has 'never heard of any of the Respondents' is implausible.

C. Florida Signatures with Chopra Foundation's CEO

In Florida, Chopra personally signed profit-venture filings with the CEO of the Chopra Foundation (*Exhibit F*). These signatures directly undermine his motion to dismiss, where he sought to distance himself from his own Foundation by claiming no involvement with business filings. Rather than separation, the record shows active participation in ventures. At the pleading stage, plaintiffs need only allege facts that 'suggest' the elements of a claim. *Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).* These filings do more than suggest, they document his involvement.

D. Trust Layering to Conceal Ownership

The concealment strategy became clear when DRVM, a revoked entity, was suddenly reactivated on April 25, 2025, under the Basil Management Trust, immediately after Petitioner's complaint and in the middle of arbitration (*Exhibit B*). Basil overlaps with multiple Bonneville entities, confirming coordinated control. This is not a routine case where only the signatory is

bound. Shell companies in this structure are designed to serve as placeholders —a 'name on paper' — so that the true beneficiaries never appear in filings. Respondents placed DRVM under a trust network precisely to shield those beneficiaries while still invoking the arbitration agreement. That agreement originated from DRVM while it was revoked, and under the third-party clause, those who benefitted from the arrangement cannot now disclaim responsibility simply because they did not sign their own names.

Courts recognize that nonsignatories who benefit from such structures cannot evade accountability. *Legacy Wireless Servs., Inc. v. Human Capital, LLC, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1056 (D. Or. 2004).* Chopra's case is stronger still: he is listed as organizer/manager of Rita GP Partners LLC (named after his wife but controlled by him), tied to Bonneville, and signed Florida filings alongside his Foundation's CEO. (*See Exhibits F, K*)

E. Misuse of "Payroll Specialist" Label

Chopra fixates on the term "payroll specialist," casting it as clerical. In reality, it refers to his role as beneficiary of wage funneling through dissolved shells and trusts. DRVM's CEO, Maged Boutros, was a nameplate; his father Ashraf Boutros co-founded Quten Research Institute with a 'Deepak Chopra.' The trusts — Basil, Dominari, and Rita GP Partners, reveal the true structure.

Taken together, these filings and trust arrangements demonstrate Petitioner had ample basis to name Chopra. Any contrary claim presents a factual dispute, and factual disputes at this stage must be tested through discovery, not dismissal. His prolonged silence was not harmless; it prolonged uncertainty, delayed resolution, and added to the very obstruction that has hindered the arbitration now before this Court. That silence, instead of clarifying matters, only reinforced the conclusion that the proper individual had been named.

F. Respondent's Inconsistent Reliance on the Arbitration Record

Respondent's motion is fundamentally inconsistent. He repeatedly insists that the Court's review must be confined to the narrow Federal Petition, yet his entire argument hinges on a term "Payroll Specialist," that is sourced from the broader arbitration record he simultaneously asks the Court to ignore.

This is an admission by Respondent that the full context of the Arbitration Demand is necessary for a fair resolution. He cannot cherry-pick a single phrase from the factual record to attack the Petition while arguing that record is irrelevant. By incorporating the "Payroll Specialist" allegation into his motion, Respondent has waived his own argument for artificially narrow review. The Court should either disregard this selective use of the record or, more appropriately, consider the full factual context from which it came, which amply demonstrates Petitioner's good-faith basis for naming Respondent Chopra.

II. RESPONDENTS HAD NOTICE AND SERVICE WAS PROPER

Chopra next argues that service was defective and that he lacked notice. The record shows the opposite: Respondents had notice for months, service was proper under JAMS rules and constitutional standards, and any objections were waived through delay. (*Exhibit M*)

This argument only underscores waiver. At the commencement of arbitration, Petitioner followed the documentary record, which pointed to 'Deepak Chopra' in corporate filings across multiple states, including entities tied to the Bonneville address on Petitioner's paystub. (*Exhibit A, G – L*)

Taken as a whole, the picture is clear: more than one Dr. Deepak Chopra is active in wellness, healthcare, and supplements space. Every Respondent is a doctor, all rooted in the

same industry. And the payroll scheme points not downward but upward, into the control of one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies.

Petitioner's evidence — corporate filings, trust records, and overlapping entities, provided a direct and reasonable basis to name 'Deepak Chopra' as a Respondent. If Respondent truly had no connection, he had six months of arbitration, numerous notices to his Foundation, and repeated opportunities to correct the record. He remained silent despite every opportunity to clarify. This is not simply just notice of legal proceedings or government inquiries; it is an active arbitration in Oregon to which he is legally tied, reinforced by multiple whistleblower filings already confirmed by federal agencies.

When a name of public prominence is attached to allegations of a nationwide fraudulent structure, the reasonable course is to promptly disavow any connection. Respondent did not. Despite repeated notices, the seriousness of the allegations, and the involvement of government agencies, he chose silence. That silence was not neutral; it is material to this claim, adding to the obstruction of the arbitration and serving as part of the very shield of entities and trusts designed to conceal the true beneficiaries.

A. Notice as Early as March 2025

JAMS records confirm Respondents were aware of the allegations by March 2025. Chopra's name remained in the arbitration caption for six months thereafter. During that period, JAMS sent dozens of notices to the Chopra Foundation address, the same address later used by the U.S. Marshals. If Chopra is not involved, he or his counsel could have corrected the record immediately. They did not. Had Chopra come forward in March 2025, when first notified that his name was being used in connection with shell entities tied to a fraudulent nationwide labor

scheme, and he offered documents to disavow that link, he would not still be a named respondent in this arbitration.

B. Silence Constitutes Waiver

The Ninth Circuit has long held that jurisdictional and service objections are waived by delay. *Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).* Chopra and his counsel sat on their rights for half a year, ignoring repeated notices. Their silence cannot now be recast as ignorance. Courts condemn such tactics. *Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012)* (notice sufficient where recipient fails to object despite opportunity).

C. JAMS Rules Govern Service

Relying on a different address in federal court, contrary to the address JAMS accepted and used for over six months, is untenable and underscores the improvised nature of this defense (*Exhibit M*). Arbitration is governed by contract, and service is controlled by the arbitral forum's rules, not by Rule 4. *Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 983 (2d Cir. 1996).* Under *JAMS Rule 5*, service is complete when the demand is sent to the last known address by hand-delivery, mail, overnight service, or electronic means. The rule does not require personal delivery to the named individual; service at the organization's business address is sufficient. Petitioner satisfied this rule, JAMS accepted service at the Chopra Foundation, and the arbitration proceeded for six months. Respondent's silence during that time constitutes waiver. To dismiss now would contradict the forum's own rules and undermine the very process Respondent has already ignored.

D. Due Process Requires Reasonable Notice, Not Formality

Even if Rule 4 standards applied, the constitutional baseline is due process: notice "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties" of the action.

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The Chopra Foundation is Chopra's own organization; service there was plainly calculated to reach him. Actual notice by March 2025 confirms sufficiency.

E. Marshal Service Confirms Validity and Remedy

When the case reached federal court, the U.S. Marshals attempted service at the same Chopra Foundation address. Both JAMS and the Marshals recognized it as valid. And even if a technical defect existed, dismissal is not the remedy. Courts quash defective service and allow re-service. *Vineyard v. Soto, 2011 WL 5358659, at 2 (D. Or. Nov. 7, 2011).*

In sum: Respondents had notice for six months, service satisfied JAMS rules and constitutional standards, and any technical objection has been waived or is curable. Chopra's service defense fails.

III. IDENTITY AND CONTROL ARE FACTUAL QUESTIONS REQUIRING DISCOVERY

Even if Respondent Chopra's denial creates ambiguity about his specific role, that ambiguity is a direct result of the respondents' own complex and obfuscatory corporate structure. The Petition serves a gatekeeping function: to compel the true parties behind the DRVM LLC arbitration agreement to proceed to arbitration and assign an arbitrator to the qualification agreed upon. The named individuals, including Respondent Chopra based on the public filings, are all potentially liable parties whose precise roles and liabilities are a core issue for the arbitrator to decide after discovery.

Dismissing a party at this preliminary stage, based solely on a self-serving declaration, would reward the very obscurity that the respondents have engineered and would frustrate the federal policy in favor of arbitrating disputes. At a minimum, the Court should permit limited

discovery to determine which 'Deepak Chopra' is implicated in the Bonneville network before considering dismissal.

A. The Public Record Creates Genuine Disputes

As detailed in Section I, multiple state filings and trust records tie Respondent Chopra to the Bonneville network. For example, Oregon filings place Chopra's name on entities connected to the Dominari 224 Trust, while Florida business records bear his personal signature alongside the Chopra Foundation's CEO. These official records contradict his blanket denial and create factual disputes that must be resolved through discovery, not dismissal.

B. Ninth Circuit Precedent Requires Discovery Where Facts Are Controverted

The Ninth Circuit emphasizes discovery when jurisdictional facts are contested:

- *Laub v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)* — "Discovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary."
- *Harris Rutsky & Co. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)* — reversing dismissal where documentary evidence suggested corporate ties despite denial.

Here, Petitioner has produced filings and trust records across multiple states. Chopra offers only denial. Under *Laub and Harris Rutsky*, this is a textbook case for jurisdictional and identity discovery.

C. Revoked Entities, Trust Layering, and Third-Party Liability

The structure at issue was intentionally built to obscure ownership. DRVM, the employer on Petitioner's paystub, was revoked and lacked corporate standing. This means no corporate veil exists to shield individuals or affiliates. Anyone tied to the 411 E. Bonneville Avenue

address on Petitioner's paystub, including those benefitting through the associated trust network, bears responsibility. That address is the anchor point of the structure, and identifying who controls and profits through it is central to this case.

The record shows a vast network of trusts (Basil Management Trust, Dominari 224 Trust, and others) tied to multiple Respondents. These interlocking trusts create ambiguity over who set the structure and who benefitted, but ambiguity is precisely why discovery is necessary. Courts recognize that third parties who directly benefit from such structures may be bound. *See Legacy Wireless, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.* This principle is reinforced by the third-party clause in the arbitration agreement itself, which expressly extends obligations to those who profit from or are intertwined with the scheme.

Respondent's six months of silence despite repeated notice, including government involvement and IRS claims, reinforces waiver. If Respondent were truly uninvolved, he would have corrected the record immediately. Instead, he allowed his name to remain in place while the scheme and legal proceedings continued, confirming the need for discovery into who is the true financial benefactor. His name appears on the very business filings connected to Sanofi-Aventis U.S., one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world. (*Exhibit L*)

In sum: The paper trail across multiple states contradicts Chopra's denials. Ninth Circuit precedent requires discovery, not dismissal, when jurisdictional facts are contested.

IV. PETITIONER STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM UNDER THE TWOMBLY–IQBAL–WATTS STANDARD

Chopra argues the Petition fails to state a claim. That argument misstates both the law and the record.

A. The Governing Standard Is Plausibility, Not Proof

The Supreme Court has made clear that *Rule 12(b)(6)* does not require a plaintiff to prove the case at the pleading stage.

- *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007):* A complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Labels and conclusions are insufficient, but factual allegations that "nudge" a claim from conceivable to plausible suffice.
- *Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009):* Courts must disregard legal conclusions but accept factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
- *Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007):* Plaintiffs need only allege facts that "suggest" the elements of their claims; proof comes later in discovery.

Together, these cases confirm that dismissal is improper where the pleadings provide factual content supporting a plausible inference of liability.

B. Dismissal Would Improperly Demand Proof Before Discovery

Chopra's argument effectively demands Petitioner prove the case now. That inverts the pleading standard. Courts have repeatedly rejected such arguments. Allegations supported by documentary evidence are enough; disputes about their truth must be resolved through discovery. *Watts, 495 F.3d at 1295.*

In sum: The Petition clears the *Twombly–Iqbal–Watts* threshold with ease. Chopra's denial may be tested in discovery, but it does not justify dismissal at the pleading stage.

V. CHOPRA BENEFITTED FROM THE STRUCTURE AND MAY BE BOUND AS A NONSIGNATORY

Chopra argues he cannot be bound because he did not personally sign the arbitration agreement. That position ignores binding precedent holding that nonsignatories who benefit directly from a contract or its underlying structure may be compelled to arbitrate or held accountable.

A. Nonsignatories May Be Bound by Estoppel

The Ninth Circuit has long applied equitable estoppel to prevent parties from accepting the benefits of a contract while avoiding its burdens. *Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006).* This principle extends to arbitration agreements: where a nonsignatory derives direct benefits from the contractual relationship, they may not disclaim its obligations. Especially when the arbitration agreement came from a revoked entity.

B. District of Oregon Precedent Confirms

This Court applied the same principle in *Legacy Wireless Servs., Inc. v. Human Capital, LLC, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1056 (D. Or. 2004)*, holding that nonsignatories benefitting from a labor-supply contract could not escape arbitration. The court denied dismissal because the nonsignatories' benefit created factual disputes requiring resolution through discovery.

C. Chopra Benefitted from the Payroll and Trust Scheme

The record shows Chopra benefitted from the very structure at issue:

- Trust layering
- Bonneville connection

These facts show that the name Deepak Chopra was not a detached outsider. It is a participant and a beneficiary of the payroll fraud structure.

D. At Minimum, Discovery Is Required

Even if Chopra disputes the extent of his benefit, that is a factual question. Under *Legacy Wireless and Comer*, courts require discovery into whether nonsignatories benefitted before considering dismissal. His motion seeks to short-circuit that process by substituting denial for evidence.

In sum: Chopra cannot avoid responsibility by pointing to the absence of his signature. Courts routinely bind nonsignatories who directly benefit from the structure at issue, and the record demonstrates that Chopra did so here. Everyone tied to this structure benefitted from it, and discovery is the appropriate means to determine the full extent of the involvement.

VI. LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL AND IDENTITY DISCOVERY IS WARRANTED

Even if the Court accepts Chopra's denials at face value, the appropriate remedy is not dismissal but jurisdictional and identity discovery, particularly where this marks his first denial since receiving notice of the proceedings in March 2025.

The Ninth Circuit is clear: where the record contains competing factual assertions about identity, control, or corporate ties, dismissal is premature.

A. Ninth Circuit Precedent Requires Discovery Where Facts Are Controverted

- *Laub v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)* — "[d]iscovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary."
- *Harris Rutsky & Co. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)* — reversing dismissal where plaintiff presented documentary evidence suggesting corporate ties despite the defendant's denial.

These holdings apply directly. While Chopra denies involvement, Petitioner has produced state filings, trust registrations, and Florida records bearing his electronic signature. This

contradiction warrants discovery. His name is tied to a multibillion-dollar payroll structure operating nationwide, and he acknowledged as early as March 2025 that it was under legal challenge in arbitration and review by government agencies.

B. Proposed Scope of Discovery

To resolve identity and control, Petitioner seeks narrowly tailored discovery limited to:

1. Corporate and Trust Records

- All formation, registration, ownership, and trust documents for KD Trans LLC, TPD IP LLC, DC DELHI GP LLC, DC-DM STEWARDSHIP INC, DCPB HOLDINGS LLC, FRANCIS 1182 LLC, RITA GP PARTNERS LLC, Rita GP Partners LLC, Basil Management Trust, Dominari 224 Trust, and any other entities tied to 411 E. Bonneville Ave. (*Exhibit C, G – L*)
- All amendments, reactivations, or trust transfers involving these entities since 2020.

2. Signatures and Identity Verification

- Copies of all state and tax filings listing "Deepak Chopra" as organizer, manager, trustee, or signatory of the above entities.
- Any verification documents (driver's license, passport, or notary acknowledgment) used to authenticate Chopra's identity on those filings.

3. Communications

- All communications between Chopra (or his representatives) and any Respondents concerning payroll, workforce management, trust ownership, or corporate structuring regarding 411 E. Bonneville.

- Communications with JAMS or Respondents' counsel acknowledging receipt of notices since March 2025.

4. Financial Records Showing Benefit

- Bank, wire, or distribution records showing payments or profits flowing to Chopra, his family, or trusts bearing his name from the entities tied to 411 E. Bonneville Ave.

5. Foundation Filings

- All Florida business filings signed by Chopra alongside the CEO of the Chopra Foundation, and any related agreements linking the Foundation to the 411 E. Bonneville-based entities.

C. Courts Routinely Order Discovery in Similar Contexts

Where nonsignatories or affiliates deny involvement despite documentary evidence, courts allow discovery to clarify the record. *Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 259 (M.D.N.C. 1988).* Chopra's denial, in the face of filings across multiple states, is a textbook example of why discovery is essential.

In sum: Chopra's denial cannot override a paper trail spanning multiple states. Ninth Circuit precedent requires discovery, not dismissal, when facts are disputed.

VII. TIMELINE CONFIRMS NOTICE AND WAIVER

The chronology of events reinforces that Chopra had notice and chose silence as a litigation strategy.

A. February 2025 — First Filed Arbitration

Petitioner filed the first complaint in February 2025, naming DRVM LLC, a revoked company, among the Respondents. At that time, Chopra's name already appeared in filings tied to entities overlapping with DRVM's address.

B. February–March 2025 — Respondents Notified

By March 2025, arbitration records confirm Respondents were served and Chopra's name appeared in the caption. He was thus on notice of the very serious allegations.

C. April 2025 — DRVM Reactivated and IRS Filings

Within weeks of notice and inside arbitration, DRVM was suddenly reactivated under the Basil Management Trust on April 25, 2025 (*Exhibit B*). That same month, the IRS assigned whistleblower claim numbers to Petitioner's filings concerning Sanofi, Chattem, and Quten. (*See Exhibit 15, of Petition, ECF 2*) The timing shows awareness and response to exposure.

D. March–September 2025 — Six Months of Silence

For six months, Chopra remained in the arbitration caption. JAMS sent dozens of notices to his Foundation address, the same address later used by the U.S. Marshals. Neither Chopra nor his counsel corrected the record or raised objections.

E. Silence as Strategy, Not Mistake

Chopra cannot reasonably claim he was unaware of repeated official notices sent to his own Foundation. The silence during the six months when entities were being moved into trusts was not a simple oversight; it highlights why discovery is necessary to determine his role.

F. Courts Condemn Strategic Delay

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that delay waives objections. *Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).* Chopra's failure to act despite six months of notice falls squarely within this principle. Excusing his prolonged silence would effectively validate delay and prevent the factual record from being fully developed.

In sum: The timeline shows repeated notice, deliberate reorganization of entities, and silence as a strategy. Courts do not reward such tactics with dismissal.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Dr. Deepak Chopra's motion to dismiss functions as a procedural tactic that risks prolonging the case and obscuring the factual record. Each of his arguments collapses when measured against the record and controlling precedent:

1. Good-faith basis — Public filings, trust structures, and Chopra's own signatures provide ample grounds to name him as a Respondent.

2. Notice and service — Respondents were on notice since March 2025. JAMS repeatedly served notices to the Chopra Foundation, the U.S. Marshals used the same address, and any objection was waived by six months of silence.

3. Identity and control — Corporate and trust filings across multiple states create factual disputes that Ninth Circuit precedent requires be resolved through discovery, not dismissal.

4. Plausibility — The Petition satisfies *Twombly, Iqbal, and Watts* by alleging specific, documented facts far beyond conclusory assertions.

5. Nonsignatory benefit — Chopra benefitted directly from the payroll and trust scheme. Under *Comer and Legacy Wireless*, nonsignatories cannot accept benefits while evading obligations.

6. Revoked entity and third-party liability — DRVM was revoked during Petitioner's employment. With no corporate veil, liability extends to those benefitting through the Bonneville-based trust structure. The arbitration agreement has a third-party clause.

7. Timeline and waiver — From January through September 2025, Respondents had notice, reactivated entities under new trusts, and remained silent.

That silence, in the face of government scrutiny and repeated service, supports a finding of waiver and underscores the need for discovery. Petitioner named Chopra based on state filings tied to the 411 E. Bonneville address and Sanofi's network (*Exhibits G - L*). Should discovery establish that he is not involved, Petitioner respectfully seeks leave to amend so that the pleadings reflect the true parties behind this structure, ensuring accountability follows the evidence.

For these reasons, dismissal is unwarranted. At minimum, limited jurisdictional and identity discovery should be ordered so these disputes can be resolved on evidence rather than evasion. Since commencement (*Exhibit M*), respondents' failure to clarify their roles despite notice, making discovery all the more necessary.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Deny Respondent Chopra's Motion to Dismiss in its entirety;
2. In the alternative, order narrowly tailored jurisdictional and identity discovery into Chopra's role in the entities and trusts identified to determine the correct parties; and
3. Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: September 25, 2025

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